INTRODUCTION

Of this essay only a part has come down to us; a few quotations from the larger part which is lost occur in later writers. It belongs to the encyclopaedia of philosophy on the composition of which Cicero embarked, after the death of his daughter Tullia in February 45 B.C., as the best service that he could render to his fellow-countrymen now that he had retired from public life. He continued working at these writings until his return to the political arena in the autumn of 44 B.C. A scheme of them will be found in *De Divinatione*, ii. §§ 1-4, where it appears that *De Fato* is an appendix to the treatise on theology formed by the three books of *De Natura Deorum* and the two books of *De Divinatione*. The same is implied in the preface to *De Fato*, § 1; and it appears from § 2 that the book was written after the death of Caesar in March 44 B.C.

The work is in the shape of a dialogue held between Cicero and Hirtius, at Cicero's villa at Puteoli (Pozzuoli on the Bay of Naples). Hirtius had been a personal and political friend of Caesar, serving as his *legatus* in Gaul in 58 B.C., and was one of the ten praetors nominated by him in 46 B.C. After his praetorship he received Belgic Gaul as his province for 44 B.C., but governed it by deputy, and attended on Caesar at Rome. Caesar nominated him consul

for 43 B.C. After Caesar's assassination Hirtius joined Antony, but was disgusted by his despotic arrogance, and retired to Puteoli, where he had a place near Cicero's. On 27th April 43 he fell in action against Antony, who was besieging Mutina. Though political opponents, Cicero and Hirtius were on very friendly terms as neighbours in the country, and had studious interests in common (*Ad Fam.* vii. 23, ix. 6, *De Fato* §§ 2, 3). Cicero had given lessons in oratory to Hirtius and Pansa, whom he used to call 'discipulos et grandes praetextatos' (Suetonius, *De Rhet.* 1).

Contents

The Introduction (§§ 1-4) implies that the book began with a discourse of Hirtius, but this is lost. What survives is part of Cicero's reply, but even this, as appears from § 41, is the second of two speeches made by him, the first having disappeared. The surviving fragment begins (§§ 6, 7) with the end of a refutation of the fatalism of Posidonius the Stoic, pupil of Panaetius and friend of Cicero. Posidonius had argued that the fact of omens shows that the future follows inevitably from the past; Cicero replies that events may equally well be due to chance. He then (§§ 7-17) turns to the view of Chrysippus, the third head and second founder of the Stoic school, and argues that although external circumstances do affect character and conduct, the will is free. Chrysippus was countered by the logic of his contemporary, the Megarian Diodorus. Epicurus's 'swerve' of the atom (§§ 18-23) is not required to avoid fatalism, since secondary causes are accidental; and Carneades,

the Academic of the second century, is right in teaching (§§ 23-25) that free-will means freedom from external compulsion, not absence of rational motive. Indeed (26-30) fate truly means only universal causation, which in part is casual; it does not mean necessity, or imply fatalism and inaction. Volition (31-38) is a fact, and circumstances are only secondary causes of action. In fact (39-45) Chrysippus steered a middle course between fatalism and freedom, and inclined to the latter, which is supported by the psychology of volition and also that of perception. . . . (§§ 46-48) Epicurus's uncaused 'swerve' is meaningless.

Editions

The text of this edition of *De Fato* is based on that in Nobbe's complete Cicero (Leipzig, 1827). Nobbe revised his book for a second edition (1850), and appended critical notes; those on *De Fato* are at p. 1387. There is an edition of *De Fato* with critical notes and a commentary by 'Henricus Alanus, Hibernicus' (London, 1839), and a Teubner text by Ax (Leipzig, 1938).

M. TULLI CICERONIS
DE FATO

1 I. . . . quia pertinet ad mores, quod ἦθος illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae de moribus appellare solemus, sed decet augentem linguam Latinam, nominare moralem. Explicandaque vis est ratioque enuntiationum, quae Graeci ἀξιώματα vocant; quae de re futura cum aliquid dicunt deque eo quod possit fieri aut non possit, quam vim habeant obscura quaestio est, quam περὶ δυνατῶν philosophi appellant; totaque est λογική, quam 'rationem disserendi' voco. Quod autem in aliis libris feci, qui sunt de natura deorum, itemque in eis quos de divinatione edidi, ut in utramque partem perpetua explicaretur oratio, quo facilius id a quoque probaretur quod cuique maxime probabile videretur, id in hac disputatione de fato
2 casus quidam ne facerem impedivit. Nam cum essem in Puteolano, Hirtiusque noster consul designatus

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[a] *i.e.* the department of philosophy termed Ethics, the name being derived from *ēthos*, 'character.'

[b] The term here means 'judgements,' not 'axioms.'

[c] '*About Things Possible*,' Theory of Possibilities.

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO

DE FATO

1 I. . . . because it [a] relates to character, called in Greek *ēthos*, while we usually term that part of philosophy 'the study of character,' but the suitable course is to add to the Latin language by giving this subject the name of 'moral science.' It is also necessary to expound the meaning and the theory of propositions, called in Greek *axiōmata* [b]; what validity these have when they make a statement about a future event and about something that may happen or may not is a difficult field of inquiry, entitled by philosophers *Peri Dynatōn* [c]; and the whole subject is *Logikē*, which I call 'the theory of discourse.' The method which I pursued in other volumes, those on the Nature of the Gods, and also in those which I have published on Divination, was that of setting out a continuous discourse both for and against, to enable each student to accept for himself the view that seems to him most probable; but I was prevented by accident [d] from adopting it
2 in the present discussion on the subject of Fate. For I was at my place at Puteoli,[e] and my friend Hirtius,

Introduction: Latin terminology.

Scene and persons of dialogue.

[d] What is referred to does not appear.
[e] See Introduction, p. 189.

eisdem in locis, vir nobis amicissimus et eis studiis in quibus nos a pueritia viximus deditus, multum una eramus, maxime nos quidem exquirentes ea consilia quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent. Cum enim omnes post interitum Caesaris novarum perturbationum causae quaeri viderentur, eisque esse occurrendum putaremus, omnis fere nostra in eis deliberationibus consumebatur oratio, idque et saepe alias, et quodam liberiore quam solebat et magis vacuo ab interventoribus die, cum ille ad me venisset, primo ea quae erant cotidiana et quasi legitima nobis, de pace et de otio.

3 II. Quibus actis, Quid ergo? inquit ille, quoniam oratorias exercitationes non tu quidem ut spero reliquisti, sed certe philosophiam illis anteposuisti, possumne aliquid audire?

Tu vero, inquam, vel audire vel dicere; nec enim, id quod recte existimas, oratoria illa studia deserui, quibus etiam te incendi, quamquam flagrantissimum acceperam, nec ea quae nunc tracto minuunt sed augent potius illam facultatem. Nam cum hoc genere philosophiae quod nos sequimur magnam habet orator societatem, subtilitatem enim ab Academia mutuatur et ei vicissim reddit ubertatem orationis et ornamenta dicendi. Quam ob rem,

the consul designate, a very close friend of mine and a devoted student of the subjects that have occupied my life from boyhood, was in the neighbourhood. Consequently we were a great deal together, being engrossed as we for our part were in seeking for a line of policy that might lead to peace and concord in the state. For since the death of Caesar it had seemed as if a search was being made for every possible means of causing fresh upheavals, and we thought that resistance must be offered to these tendencies. Consequently almost all our conversation was spent in considering those matters,—and this both on many other occasions and also, on a day less occupied by engagements than usual and less interrupted by visitors, Hirtius having come to my house, we began with our daily and regular topics of peace and tranquillity.

3 II. These dealt with, Hirtius remarked, "What now? I hope you have not actually abandoned your oratorical exercises, though you have undoubtedly placed philosophy in front of them; well then, is it possible for me to hear something?"

"Well," I said, "you can either hear something or say something yourself; for you are right in supposing that I have not abandoned my old interest in oratory,—indeed I have kindled it in you also, although you came to me an ardent devotee already; and moreover my oratorical powers are not diminished by the subjects that I now have in hand, but rather increased. For there is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlety from the Academy and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament.

inquam, quoniam utriusque studii nostra possessio est, hodie utro frui malis optio sit tua.

Tum Hirtius: Gratissimum, inquit, et tuorum omnium simile; nihil enim umquam abnuit meo
4 studio voluntas tua. Sed quoniam rhetorica mihi vestra sunt nota teque in eis et audivimus saepe et audiemus, atque hanc Academicorum contra propositum disputandi consuetudinem indicant te suscepisse Tusculanae disputationes, ponere aliquid ad quod audiam, si tibi non est molestum, volo.

An mihi, inquam, potest quidquam esse molestum quod tibi gratum futurum sit? Sed ita audies ut Romanum hominem, ut timide ingredientem ad hoc genus disputandi, ut longo intervallo haec studia repetentem.

Ita, inquit, audiam te disputantem ut ea lego quae scripsisti; proinde ordire. Considamus hic.

. . . . . .

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5 III. . . . quorum in aliis, ut in Antipatro poeta, ut in brumali die natis, ut in simul aegrotantibus fratribus, ut in urina, ut in unguibus, ut in reliquis eiusmodi, naturae contagio valet, quam ego non tollo—vis est nulla fatalis; in aliis autem fortuita quaedam esse possunt, ut in illo naufrago, ut in Icadio, ut in Daphita. Quaedam etiam Posidonius (pace

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[a] Cicero is replying to the lost thesis of Hirtius, promised in § 4; indeed the words *in prima oratione*, § 40, seem to show that this is a second speech from Cicero, his first one being lost, with the rejoinder to it that Hirtius presumably made.

[b] Unknown, as is the Icadius mentioned in this sentence, and also the meaning of the other instances of divination here quoted.

This being so," I said, " as both fields of study fall within our province, to-day it shall be for you to choose which you prefer to enjoy."

" That is most kind of you," rejoined Hirtius, " and exactly like what you do always ; for your willingness
4 never refuses anything to my inclination. But I am acquainted with the rhetorical discourses of your school, and have often heard and also often shall hear you in them ; moreover your Tusculan Disputations show that you have adopted this Academic practice of arguing against a thesis advanced ; consequently I am willing to lay down some thesis in order that I may hear the counter-arguments, if this is not disagreeable to you."

" Can anything be disagreeable to me," I said, " that will be agreeable to you ? But you will hear me speaking as a true Roman, as one who is nervous in entering on this kind of discussion, and who is returning to these studies after a long interval."

" I shall listen to your discourse in the same spirit as I read your writings ; so begin. Let us sit down here."

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5 III. " . . . [a] in some of which, for instance in the case of the poet Antipater,[b] in that of persons born on the shortest day, or of brothers who are ill at the same time, in the cases of urine and finger-nails and other things of that kind, natural connexion operates, and this I do not exclude—it is not a predestined compelling force at all ; but in other cases there can be some elements of chance, for instance with the shipwrecked sailor we spoke of, or Icadius, or Daphitas. Some cases even seem (if the

All omens ambiguous ; no proof of fate.

magistri dixerim) comminisci videtur; sunt quidem[1] absurda. Quid enim? si Daphitae fatum fuit ex equo cadere atque ita perire, ex hocne equo, qui cum equus non esset nomen habebat alienum? aut Philippus hasne in capulo quadrigulas vitare monebatur? quasi vero capulo sit occisus. Quid autem magnum aut naufragum illum sine nomine in rivo esse lapsum—quamquam huic quidem hic scribit praedictum in aqua esse pereundum? ne hercule Icadii quidem praedonis video fatum ullum; nihil enim scribit ei
6 praedictum: quid mirum igitur ex spelunca saxum in crura eius incidisse? puto enim, etiam si Icadius tum in spelunca non fuisset, saxum tamen illud casurum fuisse, nam aut nihil est omnino fortuitum aut hoc ipsum potuit evenire fortuna. Quaero igitur (atque hoc late patebit), si fati omnino nullum nomen nulla natura nulla vis esset, et forte temere casu aut pleraque fierent aut omnia, num aliter ac nunc eveniunt evenirent? Quid ergo attinet inculcare fatum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur?

7 IV. Sed Posidonium sicut aequum est cum bona

[1] quidem *Davisius:* inquam quidem *codd.:* quidem inquam *Moser.*

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[a] Posidonius.

[b] Daphitas was an epigrammatist, who tricked the oracle at Delphi by asking it whether he should find his horse; being answered that he should, he rejoined that he had never had a horse. He was punished by Attalus, king of Pergamum, by being thrown from a rock called The Horse (Hippos).

[c] Philip of Macedon had been warned by an oracle to beware of a chariot, and would never ride in one; but the

master [a] will excuse my saying so) to be the invention of Posidonius; at all events they are ridiculous. For consider: suppose it was Daphitas's destiny to fall off his horse and meet his end in that way, was it off this horse, which as it was not a real horse had a name that did not belong to it? [b] or was it against these little four-in-hands on the sword-hilt that Philip used to be warned to be on his guard? [c] just as if it was the hilt of a sword that killed him! Again, what is there remarkable about that nameless shipwrecked sailor's having fallen into a brook? although in his case indeed our authority does write that he had been warned that he was to meet his end in the water. Even in the case of the brigand Icadius I swear I can't see any trace of destiny; for the story
6 does not say that he had any warning, so that if a rock from the roof of a cave did fall on his legs, what is there surprising about it? for I suppose that even if Icadius had not been in the cave at the time, that rock would have fallen all the same, since either nothing at all is fortuitous or it was possible for this particular event to have happened by fortune. What I want to know therefore is (and this is a matter that will have a wide bearing), if there were no such word at all as fate, no such thing, no such force, and if either most things or all things took place by mere casual accident, would the course of events be different from what it is now? What is the point then of harping on fate, when everything can be explained by reference to nature and fortune without bringing fate in?

7 IV. "But let us give Posidonius the polite dis-

sword with which he was assassinated (336 B.C.) had a chariot-race carved in ivory on its hilt.

gratia dimittamus, ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur. Cui quidem primum de ipsa rerum contagione respondeamus, reliqua postea persequemur. Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit videmus: alios esse salubres, alios pestilentes, in aliis esse pituitosos et quasi redundantes, in aliis exsiccatos atque aridos; multaque sunt alia quae inter locum et locum plurimum differant. Athenis tenue caelum, ex quo etiam[1] acutiores putantur Attici, crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes. Tamen neque illud tenue caelum efficiet ut aut Zenonem quis aut Arcesilam aut Theophrastum audiat, neque crassum
8 ut Nemea[2] potius quam Isthmo[3] victoriam petat. Diiunge[4] longius: quid enim loci natura afferre potest ut in porticu Pompeii potius quam in campo ambulemus? tecum quam cum alio? Idibus potius quam Kalendis? Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet aliquid, ad quasdam autem nihil, sic affectio astrorum valeat si vis ad quasdam res, ad omnes certe non valebit. At enim quoniam in naturis hominum dissimilitudines sunt, ut alios dulcia alios subamara delectent, alii libidinosi alii iracundi aut crudeles aut superbi sint, alii a[5] talibus vitiis abhorreant,—quoniam igitur, inquit, tantum natura a

[1] etiam *: v.l.* omnes.
[2] Nemeae *? Rackham.*
[3] in Isthmo *? Rackham.*
[4] diiungo *cod. unus.*
[5] a *addidit Lambinus.*

[a] One of a group of public buildings built near the Campus Martius by Pompey; in one stood his statue, at the base of which Caesar was murdered.

missal that he deserves and return to the subtleties of Chrysippus. And first let us answer him on the actual influence of connexion; the other points we will go on to afterwards. We see the wide difference between the natural characters of different localities: we notice that some are healthy, others unhealthy, that the inhabitants of some are phlegmatic and as it were overcharged with moisture, those of others parched and dried up; and there are a number of other very wide differences between one place and another. Athens has a rarefied climate, which is thought also to cause sharpness of wit above the average in the population; at Thebes the climate is dense, and so the Thebans are stout and sturdy. All the same the rarefied air of Athens will not enable a student to choose between the lectures of Zeno, Arcesilas and Theophrastus, and the dense air of Thebes will not make a man try to win a race at Nemea
8 rather than at Corinth. Carry the distinction further: tell me, can the nature of the locality cause us to take our walk in Pompey's Porch [a] rather than in the Campus? in your company sooner than in someone else's? on the 15th of the month rather than on the 1st? Well then, just as the nature of the locality has some effect on some things but none on others, so the condition of the heavenly bodies may if you like influence some things, but it certainly will not influence everything. You will say that inasmuch as there are differences in the natures of human beings that cause some to like sweet things, others slightly bitter things, and make some licentious and others prone to anger or cruel or proud, while others shrink in horror from vices of that sort, therefore, we are told, inasmuch as there is so wide a difference

Environment affects the character but not the will;

natura distat, quid mirum est has dissimilitudines ex differentibus causis esse factas ?

9 V. Haec dissercns qua de re agatur et in quo causa consistat non videt. Non enim si alii ad alia propensiores sunt propter causas naturales et antecedentes, idcirco etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque appetitionum sunt causae naturales et antecedentes; nam nihil esset in nostra potestate si res ita se haberet. Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes imbecilline simus, non esse id in nobis, qui autem ex eo cogi putat ne ut sedeamus quidem aut ambulemus voluntatis esse, is non videt quae quamque rem res consequatur. Ut enim et ingeniosi et tardi ita nascantur, antecedentibus causis, itemque valentes et imbecilli, non sequitur tamen ut etiam sedere et ambulare et rem agere aliquam principa-
10 libus causis definitum et constitutum sit. Stilponem, Megaricum philosophum, acutum sane hominem et probatum temporibus illis accepimus. Hunc scribunt ipsius familiares et ebriosum et mulierosum fuisse, neque haec scribunt vituperantes sed potius ad laudem, vitiosam enim naturam ab eo sic edomitam et compressam esse doctrina ut nemo umquam vinolentum illum, nemo in eo libidinis vestigium viderit. Quid ? Socratem nonne legimus quemadmodum notarit Zopyrus physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore oculis

between one nature and another, what is there surprising in the view that these points of unlikeness result from different causes ?

9 V. " In putting forward this view Chrysippus fails to see the question at issue and the point with which the argument is dealing. For it does not follow that if differences in men's propensities are due to natural and antecedent causes, therefore our wills and desires are also due to natural and antecedent causes; for if that were the case, we should have no freedom of the will at all. But as it is, though we admit that it does not rest with ourselves whether we are quick-witted or dull, strong or weak, yet the person who thinks that it necessarily follows from this that even our choice between sitting still and walking about is not voluntary fails to discern the true sequence of cause and effect. For granted that clever people and stupid people are born like that, owing to antecedent causes, and that the same is true of the strong and the weak, nevertheless it does not follow that our sitting and walking and performing some action 10 are also settled and fixed by primary causes. The Megarian philosopher Stilpo, we are informed, was undoubtedly a clever person and highly esteemed in his day. Stilpo is described in the writings of his own associates as having been fond of liquor and of women, and they do not record this as a reproach but rather to add to his reputation, for they say that he had so completely mastered and suppressed his vicious nature by study that no one ever saw him the worse for liquor or observed in him a single trace of licentiousness. Again, do we not read how Socrates was stigmatized by the ' physiognomist ' Zopyrus, who professed to discover men's entire characters and

and the will modifies the character which controls action.

vultu fronte pernoscere? stupidum esse Socratem dixit et bardum quod iugula concava non haberet —obstructas eas partes et obturatas esse dicebat; addidit etiam mulierosum, in quo Alcibiades cachin-
11 num dicitur sustulisse. Sed haec ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt, exstirpari autem et funditus tolli, ut is ipse qui ad ea propensus fuerit a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est positum in naturalibus causis, sed in voluntate studio disciplina; quae tollentur[1] omnia si vis et natura fati ex divinationis ratione firmabitur.

VI. Etenim si est divinatio, qualibusnam a perceptis artis proficiscitur ('percepta' appello quae dicuntur Graece *θεωρήματα*)? Non enim credo nullo percepto aut ceteros artifices versari in suo munere aut eos qui divinatione utantur futura praedicere.
12 Sunt igitur astrologorum percepta huiusmodi: 'Si quis (verbi causa) oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur.' Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam, in qua tibi cum Diodoro valente dialectico magna luctatio est, deseras. Si enim est verum quod ita conectitur, 'Si quis oriente Canicula natus est, in

[1] *Rackham*: tolluntur *codd.*

[a] See *Tusculans* iv. 37. Socrates admitted that the character-reader had told his natural propensities correctly, but said that they had been overcome by philosophy.

[b] *Ars* means 'a science,' theoretical or practical, a systematized collection of facts; the term survives at the universities in the title *Magister Artium*, which meant 'qualified teacher of the sciences.' *Scientia* means 'knowledge,' a psychological term, denoting a state or action of the mind.

natures from their body, eyes, face and brow? he said that Socrates was stupid and thick-witted beeause he had not got hollows in the neck above the collar-bone—he used to say that these portions of his anatomy were blocked and stopped up; he also added that he was addicted to women—at which Alci-
11 biades is said to have given a loud guffaw![a] But it is possible that these defects may be due to natural causes; but their eradication and entire removal, recalling the man himself from the serious vices to which he was inclined, does not rest with natural causes, but with will, effort, training; and if the potency and the existence of fate is proved from the theory of divination, all of these will be done away with.

VI. "Indeed, if divination exists, what pray is the nature of the scientific[b] observations (I use the term 'observations' to render *theōrēmata*) which are its source? For I do not believe that those who practise divination dispense entirely with the use of observation in foretelling future events, any more than do the practitioners of all the other sciences in
12 pursuing their own function. Well then, here is a specimen of the observations of the astrologers: 'If (for instance) a man was born at the rising of the dogstar, he will not die at sea.' Keep a good look-out, Chrysippus, so as not to leave your position undefended; you have a great tussle about it with that stalwart logician Diodorus.[c] For if the connexion of propositions 'If anyone was born at the rising of the dogstar, he will not die at sea' is true, the

Divination implies a necessary sequence of events.

[c] Head of the Megarian School *c.* 300 B.C., known as ὁ διαλεκτικός.

mari non morietur,' illud quoque verum est, 'Si Fabius oriente Canicula natus est, Fabius in mari non morietur.' Pugnant igitur haec inter se, Fabium oriente Canicula natum esse et Fabium in mari moriturum, et quoniam certum in Fabio ponitur natum esse eum Canicula oriente, haec quoque pugnant, et esse Fabium et in mari esse moriturum. Ergo haec quoque coniunctio est ex repugnantibus, 'Et est Fabius et in mari Fabius morietur,' quod ut propositum est ne fieri quidem potest. Ergo illud, 'Morietur in mari Fabius,' ex eo genere est quod fieri non potest. Omne igitur quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri
13 non potest. VII. At hoc, Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est. Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum, et quidquid futurum sit id dicit fieri necesse esse et quidquid non sit futurum id negat fieri posse. Tu et quae non sint futura posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam etiam si id numquam futurum sit, neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi quamquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset. At si ista comprobabis divina praedicta, et quae falsa in futuris dicentur in eis habebis ut ea fieri non possint (ut si dicatur Africanum Karthagine non esse[1] potiturum), et si vere dicatur de futuro idque ita futurum sit,

[1] non esse *add. Alanus* (ut si . . . potiturum *secl. edd.*).

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[a] What particular member (if any) of this large and distinguished clan is referred to is not known.

[b] Scipio Africanus Minor took Carthage 146 B.C. He was found dead in his bed at Rome, 129 B.C., and it was generally

following connexion is also true, 'If Fabius [a] was born at the rising of the dogstar, Fabius will not die at sea.' Consequently the propositions 'Fabius was born at the rising of the dogstar' and 'Fabius will die at sea' are incompatible, and since that he was born at the rising of the dogstar is predicated with certainty in the case of Fabius, the propositions 'Fabius exists' and 'Fabius will die at sea' are also incompatible. Therefore also 'Fabius exists and Fabius will die at sea' is a conjunction of incompatibles, which as propounded is an impossibility. Therefore the proposition 'Fabius will die at sea' belongs to the class of impossibilities. Therefore every false proposition about the future is an im-

13 possibility. VII. But this is a view that you, Chrysippus, will not allow at all, and this is the very point about which you are specially at issue with Diodorus. He says that only what either is true or will be true is a possibility, and whatever will be, he says, must necessarily happen, and whatever will not be, according to him cannot possibly happen. You say that things which will not be are also 'possible'—for instance it is possible for this jewel to be broken even if it never will be—, and that the reign of Cypselus at Corinth was not necessary although it had been announced by the oracle of Apollo a thousand years before. But if you are going to sanction divine prophecies of that sort, you will reckon false statements as to future events (for instance a prophecy that Africanus was not going to take Carthage [b]) as being in the class of things impossible, and also, if a thing is truly stated about the future and it will be

Chrysippus denies Diodorus's identification of 'possible' with 'necessary';

thought that he had been murdered (*cf.* § 18), but this was never proved.

dicas esse necessarium est[1]; quae est tota Diodori
14 vobis inimica sententia. Etenim si illud vere conectitur, 'Si oriente Canicula natus es, in mari non morieris,' primumque quod est[2] in conexo, 'Natus es oriente Canicula,' necessarium est (omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt, ut Chrysippo placet dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia sunt immutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt convertere[3])—si igitur quod primum in conexo est necessarium est, fit etiam quod sequitur necessarium. Quamquam hoc Chrysippo non videtur valere in omnibus; sed tamen si naturalis est causa cur in mari Fabius non moriatur, in mari Fabius mori non potest.
15 VIII. Hoc loco Chrysippus aestuans falli sperat Chaldaeos ceterosque divinos, neque eos usuros esse coniunctionibus ut ita sua percepta pronuntient, 'Si quis natus est oriente Canicula, is in mari non morietur,' sed potius ita dicant, 'Non et natus est quis oriente Canicula et is in mari morietur.' O licentiam iocularem! ne ipse incidat in Diodorum, docet Chaldaeos quo pacto eos exponere percepta oporteat. Quaero enim, si Chaldaei ita loquantur ut negationes infinitarum coniunctionum potius quam infinita conexa ponant, cur idem medici, cur geometrae, cur reliqui facere non possint? Medicus in

[1] est *add. Rackham.* [2] est *add. Moser.*
[3] *v.l.* converti.

so, you would have to say that it is so ; but the whole of this is the view of Diodorus, which is alien to your
14 school. For if the following is a true connexion, ' If you were born at the rising of the dogstar you will not die at sea,' and if the first proposition in the connexion, ' You were born at the rising of the dogstar,' is necessary (for all things true in the past are necessary, as Chrysippus holds, in disagreement with his master Cleanthes, because they are unchangeable and because what is past cannot turn from true into false)—if therefore the first proposition in the connexion is necessary, the proposition that follows also becomes necessary. Although Chrysippus does not think that this holds good universally ; but all the same, if there is a natural cause why Fabius should not die at sea, it is not possible for Fabius to die at sea.

15 VIII. " At this point Chrysippus gets nervous and expresses a hope that the Chaldaeans and the rest of the prophets are mistaken, and that they will not employ conjunctions of propositions putting out their observations in the form ' If anyone was born at the rising of the dogstar he will not die at sea,' but rather will say ' It is not the case both that some person was born at the rising of the dogstar and that that person will die at sea.' O what amusing presumption ! to avoid falling into the hands of Diodorus himself he tutors the Chaldaeans as to the proper form in which to set out their observations ! For I ask you, if the Chaldaeans adopt the procedure of setting forth negations of indefinite conjunctions rather than indefinite sequences, why should it not be possible for doctors and geometricians and the other professions to do likewise ? Take a doctor to begin with :

but this denial is refuted by formal logic.

primis quod erit ei perspectum in arte non ita proponet, ' Si cui venae sic moventur, is habet febrem,' sed potius illo modo, ' Non et venae sic cui[1] moventur et febrem is non habet.' Itemque geometres non ita dicet, ' In sphaera maximi orbes medii inter se dividuntur,' sed potius illo modo, ' Non et sunt in sphaera maximi orbes et hi non medii inter se dividuntur.'

16 Quid est quod non possit isto modo ex conexo transferri ad coniunctionum negationem ? Et quidem aliis modis easdem res efferre possumus. Modo dixi, ' In sphaera maximi orbes medii inter se dividuntur ' ; possum dicere ' Si in sphaera maximi orbes erunt,' possum dicere ' Quia in sphaera maximi orbes erunt.' Multa genera sunt enuntiandi, nec ullum distortius quam hoc quo Chrysippus sperat Chaldaeos contentos Stoicorum causa fore. Illorum tamen nemo ita loquitur ; maius est enim has contortiones orationis quam signorum ortus obitusque perdiscere.

17 IX. Sed ad illam Diodori contentionem quam *περὶ δυνατῶν* appellant revertamur, in qua quid valeat id quod fieri possit anquiritur. Placet igitur Diodoro id solum fieri posse quod aut verum sit aut verum futurum sit. Qui locus attingit hanc quaestionem, nihil fieri quod non necesse fuerit, et quid-

[1] non . . . sic cui *Müller :* non ei (*vel* enim) venae sic *codd.*

[a] See § 1 note *c*.

he will not set forth a scientific principle that he has ascertained in this form, ' If a person's pulse is so and so, he has got a fever,' but rather as follows, ' It is not the case both that a person's pulse is so and so and that he has not got a fever.' And similarly a geometrician will not speak as follows, ' The greatest circles on a sphere bisect each other,' but rather as follows, ' It is not the case both that there are certain circles on the surface of a sphere that are the greatest and that these circles do not bisect each other.'

16 What is there that cannot be carried over in that sort of way from the form of a necessary consequence to that of a negation of conjoined statements? And in fact we can express the same thing in other ways. Just now I said ' The greatest circles on a sphere bisect each other '; but it is possible for me to say ' If certain circles on a sphere are the greatest,' and it is possible for me to say ' Because certain circles on a sphere will be the greatest.' There are many ways of stating a proposition, and none is more twisted round than this one, which Chrysippus hopes that the Chaldaeans will accommodate the Stoics by accepting. Yet none of the Chaldaeans really use that sort of language, for it is a bigger task to familiarize oneself with these contorted modes of expression than with the risings and settings of the constellations.

Diodorus's theory restated and upheld

17 IX. " But let us go back to the argument of Diodorus already mentioned, which they term *Peri Dynatōn*,[a] in which the meaning of the term ' possible ' is investigated. Well, Diodorus holds that only what either is true or will be true is possible. This position is connected with the argument that nothing happens which was not necessary, and that

quid fieri possit, id aut esse iam aut futurum esse, nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse quae futura sint quam ea quae facta sint ; sed in factis immutabilitatem apparere, in futuris quibusdam, quia non appareat,[1] ne inesse quidem videri, ut in eo qui mortifero morbo urgeatur verum sit ' Hic morietur hoc morbo,' at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo in quo vis morbi tanta non appareat, nihilo minus futurum sit. Ita fit ut commutatio ex vero in falsum ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit. Nam ' Morietur Scipio ' talem vim habet ut, quamquam de futuro dicitur, tamen id non possit convertere[2] in falsum ;
18 de homine enim dicitur, cui necesse est mori. Sic si diceretur, ' Morietur noctu in cubiculo suo Scipio vi oppressus,' vere diceretur, id enim fore diceretur quod esset futurum, futurum autem fuisse ex eo quia factum est intellegi debet. Nec magis erat verum ' Morietur Scipio ' quam ' Morietur illo modo,' nec magis[3] necesse mori Scipionem quam illo modo mori, nec magis immutabile ex vero in falsum ' Necatus est Scipio ' quam ' Necabitur Scipio ' ; nec, cum haec ita sint, est causa cur Epicurus fatum extimescat et ab atomis petat praesidium easque de

[1] *edd.* : appareret *codd.*
[2] *v.l.* converti.
[3] *Ramus* : minus.

[a] See § 13 note *b*.

whatever is possible either is now or will be, and that it is no more possible for things that will be to alter than it is for things that have happened; but that whereas in the things that have happened this immutability is manifest, in some things that are going to happen, because their immutability is not manifest, it does not appear to be there at all, and consequently, while the statement 'This man will die of this disease' is true in the case of a man who is suffering from a deadly disease, if this same statement is made truly in the case of a man in whom so violent an attack of the disease is not manifest, none the less it will happen. It follows that no change from true to false can occur even in the case of the future. For 'Scipio will die' has such validity that although it is a statement about the future it cannot be converted into a falsehood, for it is a statement about a human being, who must inevitably
18 die. If the form of the statement had been 'Scipio will die by violence in his bedroom at night,'[a] the statement in that form would have been a true one, for it would have been a statement that a thing was going to happen that was going to happen, and that it was going to happen is a necessary inference from the fact that it did happen. Neither was 'Scipio will die' any truer than 'Scipio will die in that manner,' nor was it more inevitable for Scipio to die than it was for him to die in that manner, nor was it more impossible for the statement 'Scipio has been murdered' to change from a truth to a falsehood than for the statement 'Scipio will be murdered'; nor, these things being so, is there any reason for Epicurus's standing in terror of fate and seeking protection against it from the atoms and making them

Nevertheless Epicurus's 'swerve' needless to avoid

via deducat, et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam ut sine causa fiat aliquid—, ex quo exsistet ut de nihilo quippiam fiat, quod nec ipsi nec cuiquam physico placet—alteram ut, cum duo individua per inanitatem ferantur, alterum e regione
19 moveatur, alterum declinet. Licet enim Epicuro, concedenti omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum esse, non vereri ne omnia fato fieri sit necesse ; non enim aeternis causis naturae necessitate manantibus verum est id quod ita enuntiatur, ' Descendet[1] in Academiam Carneades,' nec tamen sine causis, sed interest inter causas fortuito antegressas et inter causas cohibentes in se efficientiam naturalem. Ita et semper verum fuit ' Morietur cum duo et septuaginta annos vixerit, archonte Pytharato,' neque tamen erant causae fatales cur ita accideret, sed quod ita
20 cecidit[2] certe casurum[3] sicut cecidit fuit. Nec ei qui dicunt immutabilia esse quae futura sint nec posse verum futurum convertere[4] in falsum, fati necessitatem confirmant, sed verborum vim interpretantur; at qui introducunt causarum seriem sempiternam,

[1] *Loercher :* descendit.
[2] *Bremius :* cecidisset.
[3] ⟨serie⟩ certa ⟨causarum⟩ casurum *edd.*
[4] *v.l.* converti.

[a] Epicurus held that, as the atoms fall vertically through space at the same velocity, they would never meet, were it not that any one of them occasionally makes an entirely uncaused swerve, thus sometimes coming into collision with other atoms and ultimately producing one of the clusters of atoms of which visible things consist. Such a swerve taking

swerve out of the perpendicular,[a] and entertaining simultaneously two utterly inexplicable propositions, one that something takes place without a cause— from which it will follow that something comes out of nothing, which neither Epicurus nor any natural philosopher allows—, the other that when two atoms are travelling through empty space one moves in a
19 straight line and the other swerves. For it is not necessary for Epicurus to fear lest, when he admits that every proposition is either true or false, all events must necessarily be caused by fate ; for the truth of a proposition of the form ' Carneades will go down to the Academy ' is not due to an eternal stream of natural and necessary causation, and yet nevertheless it is not uncaused, but there is a difference between causes accidentally precedent and causes intrinsically containing a natural efficiency. Thus it is the case *both* that the statement ' Epicurus will die in the archonship of Pytharatus,[b] at the age of seventy-two,' was always true, *and* also that nevertheless there were no fore-ordained causes why it should so happen, but, because it did so fall out, it was certainly going to
20 fall out as it actually did.[c] Moreover those who say that things that are going to be are immutable and that a true future event cannot be changed into a false one, are not asserting the necessity of fate but explaining the meaning of terms ; whereas those who bring in an everlasting series of causes rob the

fatalism since secondary causes are accidental

place among the atoms of a man's mind is what is known to his consciousness as an act of arbitrary volition : this was Epicurus's method of proving the freedom of the will. See §§ 21 ff. and Lucretius ii. 216 ff.

[b] 270 B.C.

[c] Editors emend the text to give ' was going to befall by a definite series of causes.'

ei mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliatam necessitate fati devinciunt.

X. Sed haec hactenus; alia videamus. Concludit enim Chrysippus hoc modo: 'Si est motus sine causa, non omnis enuntiatio (quod ἀξίωμα dialectici appellant) aut vera aut falsa erit, causas enim efficientes quod non habebit id nec verum nec falsum erit; omnis autem enuntiatio aut vera aut falsa est; 21 motus ergo sine causa nullus est. Quod si ita est, omnia quae fiunt causis fiunt antegressis; id si ita est, omnia fato fiunt; efficitur igitur fato fieri quaecumque fiant.' Hic primum si mihi libeat assentiri Epicuro et negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse aut falsam, eam plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri comprobem; illa enim sententia aliquid habet disputationis, haec vero non est tolerabilis. Itaque contendit omnes nervos Chrysippus ut persuadeat omne ἀξίωμα aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut enim Epicurus veretur ne, si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant (si enim alterutrum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum, et si certum, etiam necessarium: ita et necessitatem et fatum confirmari putat), sic Chrysippus metuit ne, si non obtinuerit omne quod enuntietur aut verum esse aut falsum, non teneat omnia 22 fato fieri et ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum. Sed Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari fati necessitatem putat; itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra

[a] See § 1 note *b*.

human mind of freewill and fetter it in the chains of a fated necessity.

X. "But enough of these subjects; let us examine others. For Chrysippus argues thus: 'If uncaused motion exists, it will not be the case that every proposition (termed by the logicians an *axiōma* [a]) is either true or false, for a thing not possessing efficient causes will be neither true nor false; but every proposition is either true or false; therefore uncaused
21 motion does not exist. If this is so, all things that take place take place by precedent causes; if this is so, all take place by fate; it therefore follows that all things that take place take place by fate.' At this point, in the first place if I chose to agree with Epicurus and to say that not every proposition is either true or false, I would rather suffer that nasty knock than agree that all events are caused by fate; for the former opinion has something to be said for it, but the latter is intolerable. Accordingly Chrysippus exerts every effort to prove the view that every *axiōma* is either true or false. For just as Epicurus is afraid that if he admits this he will also have to admit that all events whatever are caused by fate (on the ground that if either of two alternatives is true from all eternity, that alternative is also certain, and if it is certain it is also necessary. This, he thinks, would prove both necessity and fate), similarly Chrysippus fears that if he fails to maintain that every proposition is either true or false he will not carry his point that all things happen by fate and spring
22 from eternal causes governing future events. But Epicurus thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of an atom; and so in addition to gravity and impact there arises a third form of

Chrysippus proved fate by formal logic.

Epicurus's 'swerve' as basis for free-will

pondus et plagam, cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo (id appellat ἐλάχιστον). Quam declinationem sine causa fieri, si minus verbis, re cogitur confiteri ; non enim atomus ab atomo pulsa declinat, nam qui potest pelli alia ab alia si gravitate feruntur ad perpendiculum corpora individua rectis lineis, ut Epicuro placet ? sequitur autem[1] ut, si alia ab alia numquam depellatur, ne contingat quidem alia aliam; ex quo efficitur, etiam si sit atomus eaque declinet, declinare[2] sine causa.

23 Hanc Epicurus rationem induxit ob eam rem quod veritus est ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita movcretur animus ut atomorum motu cogeretur. Id Democritus auctor atomorum accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere. XI. Acutius Carneades, qui docebat posse Epicureos suam causam sine hac commenticia declinatione defendere. Nam cum docerent esse posse quemdam animi motum voluntarium, id fuit defendi melius quam introducere declinationem, cuius praesertim causam reperire non possent ; quo defenso facile Chrysippo possent resistere, cum enim concessissent motum nullum esse sine causa, non concederent omnia quae fierent fieri causis antecedentibus, voluntatis enim nostrae
24 non esse causas externas et antecedentes. Communi

[1] autem *Davisius :* enim *cum codd. Usener, Plasberg.*
[2] *v.l.* declinare eam, *sed cf.* § *24 fin.*

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[a] *i.e.* asserted dogmatically, not put as an inference from the atomic theory.

motion, when the atom swerves sideways a minimal space (termed by Epicurus *elachiston*). Also he is compelled to profess in reality, if not quite explicitly, that this swerve takes place without cause ; for the atom does not swerve in consequence of being struck by another atom, since how can impact between them take place if they are indivisible bodies travelling perpendicularly in straight lines by the force of gravity, as Epicurus holds ? but it follows that if one is never driven aside by another, one will never even meet another ; the consequence is that, even granting that the atom exists and that it swerves, the swerve is uncaused.

23 " The reason why Epicurus brought in this theory was his fear lest, if the atom were always carried along by the natural and necessary force of gravity, we should have no freedom whatever, since the movement of the mind was controlled by the movement of the atom. The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions. XI. Carneades showed greater insight : his doctrine was that the school of Epicurus could have maintained its cause without this fictitious swerve. For it would have been better for the dogma of the possibility of some voluntary movement of the mind to be maintained [a] than for them to introduce the swerve, especially as they were unable to invent a cause for it ; and by maintaining that dogma they could easily have withstood Chrysippus, for in admitting that no motion is uncaused they would not have been admitting that all events are due to antecedent causes, as they would have said that there are no external and antecedent

proved needless by Carneades : free-will means volition without *external* cause.

igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur cum ita dicimus, velle aliquid quempiam aut nolle sine causa ; ita enim dicimus sine causa ut dicamus sine externa et antecedente causa, non sine aliqua. Ut cum vas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet, sed ita ut verbi causa sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus, sic, cum sine causa animum moveri dicimus, sine antecedente et externa causa moveri, non omnino sine causa dicimus. De ipsa atomo dici potest, cum per inane moveatur gravitate et pondere, sine causa moveri, quia nulla
25 causa accedat extrinsecus ; rursus autem, ne omnes a physicis[1] irrideamur si dicamus quidquam fieri sine causa, distinguendum est et ita dicendum, ipsius individui hanc esse naturam ut pondere et gravitate moveatur, eamque ipsam esse causam cur ita feratur. Similiter ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requirenda externa causa ; motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se ipse continet ut sit in nostra potestate nobisque pareat, nec id sine causa, eius
26 enim rei causa ipsa natura est. Quod cum ita sit, quid est cur non omnis pronuntiatio aut vera aut falsa sit, nisi concesserimus fato fieri quaecumque fiant ? Quia futura vera, inquit, non possunt esse

[1] a physicis *edd.* : physici *codd.* (homines *vel* omnibus a *pro* omnes *edd.*, omnes physici rideant nos *Müller*).

24 causes of our volition. Therefore when we use the expression 'Somebody wishes (or does not wish) something without cause,' we are perverting the accepted convention of language; for we are using the phrase 'without cause' in the sense of 'without an external and antecedent cause,' not 'without a cause of some kind.' Just as when we say that a vessel is empty we do not use the expression in the sense in which it is used by the natural philosophers, who hold that no absolute vacuum exists, but we employ it to mean that the vessel has (for example) no water in it, or wine, or oil, similarly when we say that the mind moves without cause we mean that it moves without an antecedent external cause, not without any cause at all. Motion without cause can be predicated of the atom itself in moving through void by reason of gravity and weight, because there is no additional
25 cause from outside; but on the other hand, for fear lest we all be laughed at by the natural philosophers if we say that anything takes place without a cause, a distinction must be made, and the matter must be put in this way, that it is the nature of the atom itself to be kept in motion by weight and gravity, and that its nature is itself the cause of its travelling in this manner. Similarly no external cause need be sought to explain the voluntary movements of the mind; for voluntary motion possesses the intrinsic property of being in our power and of obeying us, and its obedience is not uncaused, for its nature is itself the
26 cause of this. This being so, what is the reason why every proposition is not either true or false, if we do not allow that whatever takes place is caused by fate? The reason is, says he, that future things that have not got causes *why* they will be in the future

Universal causation implies fate, but not necessity: some causes are fortuitous;

ea quae causas cur futura sint non habent ; habeant igitur causas necesse est ea quae vera sunt ; ita cum evenerint, fato evenerint. XII. Confectum negotium, siquidem tibi concedendum est aut fato omnia fieri
27 aut quidquam posse fieri sine causa. An aliter haec enuntiatio vera esse potest,[1] ' Capiet Numantiam Scipio,' nisi ex aeternitate causa causam serens hoc erit effectura ? an hoc falsum potuisset esse si esset sexcentis saeculis ante dictum ? Et si tum non esset vera haec enuntiatio, ' Capiet Numantiam Scipio,' ne illa quidem eversa vera est haec enuntiatio, ' Cepit Numantiam Scipio.' Potest igitur quicquam factum esse quod non verum fuerit futurum esse ? Nam ut praeterita ea vera dicimus quorum superiore tempore vera fuerit instantia, sic futura quorum consequenti tempore vera erit instantia, ea vera dicemus.
28 Nec si omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum est, sequitur ilico esse causas immutabiles, easque aeternas, quae prohibeant quidquam secus cadere atque casurum sit. Fortuitae sunt causae quae efficiant, ut vere dicantur quae ita dicentur, ' Veniet in senatum Cato,' non inclusae in rerum natura atque mundo ; et tamen tam est immutabile venturum, cum est verum, quam venisse (nec ob eam causam fatum aut necessitas extimescenda est) ; etenim erit confiteri necesse ' Si haec enuntiatio, " Veniet in Tusculanum

[1] potest *Rackham :* non potest *codd.*

cannot be true ; therefore those that are true must necessarily have causes ; accordingly when they have occurred they will have occurred by fate. XII. That ends the business, inasmuch as you are bound to admit either that everything takes place by fate or that
27 something can take place without a cause. Consider the statement ' Scipio will take Numantia '[a] : if an external chain of interlinked causes is not going to bring this about, can it be true[b] in any other manner ? could it have been false if it had been said innumerable ages ago ? And if the statement ' Scipio will take Numantia ' had not been true then, even after Numantia has fallen the statement ' Scipio has taken Numantia ' is not true either. Therefore is it possible for anything to have happened that was not previously going to be true ? For just as we speak of past things as true that possessed true actuality at some former time, so we speak of future things as true that will possess true actuality at some following
28 time. Yet it does not immediately follow from the fact that every statement is either true or false that there are immutable causes, eternally existing, that forbid anything to fall out otherwise than it will fall out. The causes which bring it about that statements of the form ' Cato will come into the Senate ' are true statements, are fortuitous, they are not inherent in the nature of things and the order of the universe ; and nevertheless ' he will come,' when true, is as immutable as ' he has come ' (though we need not on that account be haunted by fear of fate or necessity), for it will necessarily be admitted that if the statement ' Hortensius will come to his place

[a] Scipio (*cf.* § 13 note) took Numantia in Spain 133 B.C.
[b] The MSS. give ' can it be not true.'

Hortensius," vera[1] non est, sequitur ut falsa sit.' Quorum isti neutrum volunt; quod fieri non potest.

Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio quae dicitur; appellatur enim quidam a philosophis ἀργὸς λόγος, cui si pareamus nihil omnino agamus in vita. Sic enim interrogant: 'Si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive medicum adhibueris sive non ad-
29 hibueris convalesces; item, si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris non convalesces; et alterutrum fatum est; medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet.' XIII. Recte genus hoc interrogationis ignavum atque iners nominatum est, quod eadem ratione omnis e vita tolletur actio. Licet etiam immutare, ut fati nomen ne adiungas et eamdem tamen teneas sententiam, hoc modo: 'Si ex aeternitate verum hoc fuit, "Ex isto morbo convalesces," sive adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris convalesces; itemque, si ex aeternitate falsum hoc fuit, "Ex isto morbo[2] convalesces," sive adhibueris medicum sive non adhibu-
30 eris non convalesces'; deinde cetera. Haec ratio a Chrysippo reprehenditur. Quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata; simplex est, 'Morietur illo die Socrates'; huic, sive quid fecerit sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. At si ita fatum est,[3] 'Nascetur Oedipus Laio,' non poterit dici, 'sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit';

[1] *v.l.* verum . . . falsum (*sic edd. quidam, et* hoc enuntiatum *pro* haec enuntiatio).
[2] morbo *edd.*: morbo non *codd.* [3] *Madvig*: erit.

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[a] On a spur of Mons Albanus, ten miles S.E. of Rome, near Frascati.
[b] The Latin is a translation of the Greek term that follows.

at Tusculum '[a] is not true, it follows that it is false. Our opponents hold that it is neither; which is impossible.

and the existence of fate does not mean inaction:

"Nor shall we for our part be hampered by what is called the 'idle argument'[b]—for one argument is named by the philosophers the *Argos Logos*, because if we yielded to it we should live a life of absolute inaction. For they argue as follows: 'If it is fated for you to recover from this illness, you will recover
29 whether you call in a doctor or do not; similarly, if it is fated for you not to recover from this illness, you will not recover whether you call in a doctor or do not; and either your recovery or your non-recovery is fated; therefore there is no point in calling in a doctor.' XIII. This mode of arguing is rightly called 'idle' and indolent, because the same train of reasoning will lead to the entire abolition of action from life. It is even possible to alter the form by not introducing the word 'fate' and yet to retain the same meaning, thus: 'If the statement "You will recover from that illness" has been true from all eternity, you will recover whether you call in a doctor or do not; and similarly if the statement "You will recover from that illness" has been false from all eternity, you will not recover whether you call in a doctor or not'—the conclusion following as before.

action is fated, as well as its object.

30 This argument is criticized by Chrysippus. For, he says, there exist in actuality two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date'; in this case, whether he does some action or does not do it, the day of his death has been determined. But if it is fated that 'Laius will have a son Oedipus,' it will not be possible for the words 'whether Laius mates with a

copulata enim res est et confatalis : sic enim appellat quia ita fatum sit, et concubiturum cum uxore Laium et ex ea Oedipum procreaturum : ut si esset dictum, ' Luctabitur Olympiis Milo,' et referret aliquis, ' Ergo sive habuerit adversarium, sive non habuerit luctabitur,' erraret ; est enim copulatum ' luctabitur,' quia sine adversario nulla luctatio est. Omnes igitur istius generis captiones eodem modo refelluntur. ' Sive tu adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces ' captiosum ; tam enim est fatale medicum adhibere quam convalescere. Haec, ut dixi, confatalia ille appellat.

31 XIV. Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat et nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat. Itaque premebat alio modo, nec ullam adhibebat calumniam ; cuius erat haec conclusio : ' Si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali colligatione conserte contexteque fiunt ; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit ; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate. Est autem aliquid in nostra potestate. At, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt. Non igitur fato fiunt quaecumque
32 fiunt.' Haec[1] artius astringi ratio non potest. Nam si quis velit idem referre, atque ita dicere, ' Si omne futurum ex aeternitate verum est, ut ita certe eveniat quemadmodum sit futurum, omnia necesse est colligatione naturali conserte contexteque fieri,'

[1] hoc *Turnebus.*

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[a] *συνειμαρμένον.*

[b] This famous wrestler won six times at Olympia in the later years of the 6th cent. B.C.

woman or does not ' to be added, for the matter is complex and ' condestinate '[a]—he gives that name to it because he thinks it is fated both that Laius will lie with a wife and that he will beget Oedipus by her: in the same way as, supposing it were said that ' Milo[b] will wrestle at Olympia ' and somebody replied ' If so, he will wrestle whether he has an opponent or not,' he would be wrong ; for ' will wrestle ' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. Therefore all captious arguments of that sort can be refuted in the same way. ' You will recover whether you call in a doctor or do not ' is captious, for calling in a doctor is just as much fated as recovering. These connected events, as I said, are termed by Chrysippus ' condestinate.'

31 XIV. " Carneades refused to accept this class of things entirely, and held the view that the line of argument in question was not quite accurately thought out. In consequence he used to put his case in another manner, and did not employ any trickery ; his argument ran like this : ' If everything takes place with antecedent causes, all events take place in a closely knit web of natural interconnexion ; if this is so, all things are caused by necessity ; if this is true, nothing is in our power. But something is in our power. Yet if all events take place by fate, there are antecedent causes of all events. Therefore it is not the case that whatever events take place take
32 place by fate.' This line of argument cannot be made more rigidly conclusive. For if anybody chose to repeat the same point and to put it thus, ' If all that will be is from eternity true, so that it must certainly turn out as it will be, events necessarily take place in a closely knit web of natural interconnexion,'

Carneades held that volition disproves fate, and that only necessary results can be predicted.

nihil dicat. Multum enim differt utrum causa naturalis ex aeternitate futura vera efficiat an etiam sine aeternitate naturali futura quae sint ea vera esse possint intellegi. Itaque dicebat Carneades ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere nisi ea quorum causas natura ita contineret ut ea fieri necesse esset.
33 Quid enim spectans deus ipse diceret Marcellum eum qui ter consul fuit in mari esse periturum ? erat quidem hoc verum ex acternitate, sed causas id efficientes non habebat. Ita ne praeterita quidem ea quorum nulla signa tamquam vestigia exstarent Apollini nota esse censebat, quanto[1] minus futura, causis enim efficientibus quamque rem cognitis posse denique sciri quid futurum esset ; ergo nec de Oedipode potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis cur ab eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quidquam eiusmodi. XV. Quocirca si Stoicis qui omnia fato fieri dicunt consentaneum est huiusmodi oracula ceteraque quae ad divinationem pertinent[2] comprobare, eis[3] autem qui quae futura sunt ea vera esse ex aeternitate dicunt non idem dicendum est, vide ne non eadem sit illorum

[1] *v.l.* quo.
[2] pertinent *: v.l.* dicuntur *:* pertinere dicuntur *edd. nonnulli*, a divinatione ducuntur *Madvig.*
[3] eis *:* ⟨de⟩ eis *? Rackham.*

[a] M. Claudius Marcellus, consul 166, 155 and 152 B.C.,

he would be talking nonsense. For it makes a great deal of difference whether a natural cause, existing from all eternity, renders future things true, or things that are going to be in the future can be understood to be true even without any natural eternity. Accordingly Carneades used to say that not even Apollo could tell any future events except those whose causes were so held together by nature
33 that they must necessarily happen. For what consideration could lead the god himself to say that the Marcellus who was three times consul was going to die at sea?[a] this had indeed been true from all eternity, but it had no efficient causes. Therefore Carneades held the view that Apollo had no knowledge even of these past events which had left behind them no trace of their passage—how much less had he knowledge of future events, for only by knowing the efficient causes of all things was it possible to know the future; therefore it was impossible for Apollo to foretell the fate of Oedipus when there were no causes fore-ordained in the nature of things making it necessary for him to murder his father, nor could he foretell anything of the sort.

XV. Hence if, while it is consistent for the Stoics, who say that all things happen by fate, to accept oracles of this sort and all the other things connected with divination, yet the same position cannot be held by[b] those who say that the things which are going to happen in the future have been true from all eternity, observe that their case is not the same as

Hence the Academy cannot defend prophecy, which assumes necessary causation.

was shipwrecked in 148 B.C. when going on an embassy to Masinissa, king of Numidia.

[b] Perhaps the Latin should be altered to give 'the same cannot be said about.'

causa et Stoicorum ; hi enim urgentur angustius,
34 illorum ratio soluta ac libera est. Quodsi concedatur nihil posse evenire nisi causa antecedente, quid proficiatur si ea causa non ex aeternis causis apta dicatur ?[1] Causa autem ea est quae id efficit cuius est causa, ut vulnus mortis, cruditas morbi, ignis ardoris. Itaque non sic causa intellegi debet ut quod cuique antecedat id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedat, nec quod in campum descenderim id fuisse causae cur pila luderem, nec Hecubam causam interitus fuisse Troianis quod Alexandrum genuerit, nec Tyndareum Agamemnoni quod Clytaemnestram. Hoc enim modo viator quoque bene vestitus causa
35 grassatori fuisse dicetur cur ab eo spoliaretur. Ex hoc genere illud est Ennii,

> utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
> caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes!

Licuit vel altius, ' Utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla umquam esset arbor ! ' etiam supra, ' Utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius ! ' similiterque superiora repetentem regredi infinite licet.

> Neve inde navis inchoandi exordium
> cepisset.

Quorsum haec praeterita ? quia sequitur illud,

[1] *v.l.* ducatur.

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[a] Ennius adapted Euripides's *Medea*, which begins :

> εἴθ' ὤφελ' Ἀργοῦς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος
> Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν κυανέας Ξυμπληγάδας,
> μηδ' ἐν νάπαισι Πηλίου πεσεῖν ποτε
> τμηθεῖσα πεύκη μηδ' ἐρετμῶσαι χέρας
> ἀνδρῶν ἀριστέων οἳ τὸ πάγχρυσον δέρας
> Πελίᾳ μετῆλθον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δέσποιν' ἐμὴ
> Μήδεια πύργους γῆς ἔπλευσ' Ἰωλκίας,
> ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ' Ἰάσονος.

Pēlion or Pēlios was a mountain range in Thessaly.

that of the Stoics ; for their position is more limited and narrow, whereas the Stoic theory is untrammelled
34 and free. Even if it be admitted that nothing can happen without an antecedent cause, what good would that be unless it be maintained that the cause in question is a link in an eternal chain of causation ? But a cause is that which makes the thing of which it is the cause come about—as a wound is the cause of death, failure to digest one's food of illness, fire of heat. Accordingly ' cause ' is not to be understood in such a way as to make what precedes a thing the cause of that thing, but what precedes it effectively : the cause of my playing tennis was not my going down into the Campus, nor did Hecuba's giving birth to Alexander make her the cause of the death of Trojans, nor was Tyndareus the cause of Agamemnon's death because he was the father of Clytemnestra. For on those lines a well-dressed traveller also will be said to have been the cause of the high-
35 wayman's robbing him of his clothes. To this class of expression belongs the phrase of Ennius [a]—

Distinction between circumstances and efficient causes.

> Would that in Pelius' glade the pine-tree beams
> Had never fallen to earth by axes hewn !

He might have gone even further back, ' Would that no tree had ever grown on Pelius ! ' and even further, ' Would that no Mount Pelius existed ! ' and similarly one may go on recalling preceding events in infinite regress.

> Nor thence had made inception of the task
> Of laying down a ship.

What is the point of recounting these past events ? because what follows is this :

nam numquam era errans mea domo ecferret pedem
Medea, animo aegra, amore saevo saucia,

non erat[1] ut eae res causam afferrent amoris.

36 XVI. Interesse autem aiunt utrum eiusmodi quid sit sine quo aliquid effici non possit an eiusmodi quo aliquid effici necesse sit. Nulla igitur earum est causa, quoniam nulla eam rem sua vi efficit cuius causa dicitur ; nec id sine quo quippiam non fit causa est, sed id quod cum accessit id cuius causa est efficit necessario. Nondum enim ulcerato serpentis morsu Philocteta quae causa in rerum natura continebatur fore ut is in insula Lemno linqueretur? post autem
37 causa fuit propior et cum exitu iunctior. Ratio igitur eventus aperuit[2] causam ; sed ex aeternitate vera fuit haec enuntiatio, ' Relinquetur in insula Philoctetes,' nec hoc ex vero in falsum poterat convertere.[3] Necesse est enim in rebus contrariis duabus—contraria autem hoc loco ea dico quorum alterum ait quid, alterum negat—ex eis igitur necesse est invito Epicuro alterum verum esse, alterum falsum, ut ' Sauciabitur Philocteta ' omnibus ante saeculis verum fuit, ' Non sauciabitur ' falsum ; nisi forte volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales enuntiationes

[1] erat *addidit Rackham.*
[2] *Rackham :* aperit *codd.*
[3] *v.l.* converti.

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[a] The Latin text is here corrupt.
[b] Modern logic terms such propositions ' contradictory.'

For were it so, my roving royal mistress,
Medea, from her home had ne'er set forth,
Heartsick and by love's cruel weapon wounded.

It was not the case that those events brought the cause of love.[a]

36 XVI. "But they declare that there is a difference whether a thing is of such a kind that something cannot be effected without it, or such that something must necessarily be effected by it. None of the causes mentioned therefore is really a cause, since none by its own force effects the thing of which it is said to be the cause; nor is that which is a condition of a thing's being effected a cause, but that of which the access necessarily produces the thing of which it is the cause. For at the time when the snake-bite had not yet caused Philoctetes to be afflicted with a sore, what cause was contained in the nature of things that would bring it to pass that he would be marooned on the Isle of Lemnos? whereas afterwards the cause was nearer and more closely
37 connected with his death. Therefore it was the principle underlying the result that revealed the cause; but the proposition 'Philoctetes will be marooned on an island' had been true from all eternity, and this could not be turned from a truth into a falsehood. For it is necessary that of two contrary propositions—by contrary I here mean propositions one of which affirms something and the other denies it[b]—of these two propositions therefore it is necessary, *pace* Epicurus, that one should be true and the other false; for example, 'Philoctetes will be wounded' was true, and 'Philoctetes will not be wounded' false, for the whole of the ages of the past; unless perhaps we choose to follow the opinion of the Epi-

nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut, cum id pudet, illud tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis disiunctiones, sed quae in his enuntiata
38 sint,[1] eorum neutrum esse verum. O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem inscientiam disserendi! Si enim aliquid in eloquendo nec verum nec falsum est, certe id verum non est; quod autem verum non est, qui potest non falsum esse? aut quod falsum non est, qui potest non verum esse? Tenebitur igitur[2] id quod a Chrysippo defenditur, omnem enuntiationem aut veram aut falsam esse; ratio ipsa coget et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera et ea non esse nexa causis aeternis et a fati necessitate esse libera.

39 XVII. Ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum vim necessitatis afferret, in qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse,—sed applicat se ad eos potius qui necessitate motus animos[3] liberatos volunt; dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas difficultates
40 ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus. Atque hoc, si placet, quale sit videamus in assensionibus, quas

[1] *Rackham:* essent *codd.*
[2] igitur *addit Lambinus* (ergo *Davisius*).
[3] animorum *Davisius.*

cureans, who say that propositions of this sort are neither true nor false, or else, when ashamed of that, they nevertheless make the still more impudent assertion that disjunctions consisting of contrary propositions are true, but that the statements contained in the propositions are neither of them true.
38 What marvellous effrontery and pitiable ignorance of logical method! For if anything propounded is neither true nor false, it certainly is not true; but how can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true? We shall therefore hold to the position maintained by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false; reason itself will insist *both* that certain things are true from all eternity *and* that they are not involved in a nexus of eternal causes but are free from the necessity of fate.

39 XVII. "And my own view at all events is that, as between the two opinions held by the old philosophers, on the one hand the opinion of those who deemed that everything takes place by fate in the sense that this fate exercises the force of necessity —the opinion to which Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle adhered—and on the other hand the opinion of those who held that the movements of the mind are voluntary and not at all controlled by fate, Chrysippus stood as unofficial umpire and wished to strike a compromise,—though as a matter of fact he inclines to adhere to those who hold that the mind is released from all necessity of motion; but in employing formulae peculiar to himself he slips into such difficulties that against his will he
40 lends support to the necessity of fate. And let us if you please examine the nature of this doctrine in

Chrysippus's view half-way between necessity of fate and freedom of will.

Psychology of volition.

prima oratione tractavi. Eas enim veteres illi quibus omnia fato fieri videbantur vi effici et necessitate dicebant. Qui autem ab eis dissentiebant, fato assensiones liberabant negabantque fato assensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab his posse removeri; eique ita disserebant: 'Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente; et si appetitus, illa etiam quae appetitum sequuntur; ergo etiam assensiones. At si causa appetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem appetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem quae appetitu efficiuntur sunt sita in nobis. Non sunt igitur neque assensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate. Ex quo efficitur ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia.' Quod eum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri quaecumque fiant.

41 XVIII. Chrysippus autem cum et necessitatem improbaret et nihil vellet sine praepositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut et necessitatem effugiat et retineat fatum. 'Causarum enim,' inquit, 'aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae; quam ob rem cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus, causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus[1] et proximis.' Itaque illi rationi quam paullo ante conclusi sic occurrit: si omnia fato

[1] adiuvantibus *Davisius*: adiuvantibus antecedentibus *codd.*

[a] In the lost part of the dialogue.

connexion with the topic of assent, which I treated in my first discourse.[a] Those old philosophers who held that everything takes place by fate used to say that assent is given perforce as the result of necessity. On the other hand those who disagreed with them released assent from bondage to fate, and maintained that if assent were made subject to fate it would be impossible to dissociate it from necessity. They argued as follows : ' If all things take place by fate, all things take place with an antecedent cause ; and if desire is caused, those things which follow desire are also caused ; therefore assent is also caused. But if the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power ; and if this is so, those things which are caused by desire also do not rest with us. It follows therefore that neither assent nor action is in our power. From this it results that there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments.' But as this is erroneous, they hold that it is a valid inference that not everything that takes place takes place by fate.

41 XVIII. " But Chrysippus, since he refused on the one hand to accept necessity and held on the other hand that nothing happens without fore-ordained causes, distinguishes different kinds of causation, to enable himself at the same time to escape necessity and to retain fate. ' Some causes,' he says, ' are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes.' Accordingly he counters the argument that I set out a little time ago by saying that, if everything takes

His distinction of causes as (1) principal, (2) auxiliary leaves desire in our power

fiant, sequi illud quidem ut omnia eausis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus et perfectis sed adiuvantibus et proximis. Quae si ipsae non sunt in nostra potestate, non sequitur ut ne appetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. At hoc sequeretur si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum hae causae non essent in nostra potestate, ne
42 ille quidem esset in nostra potestate. Quam ob rem qui ita fatum introducunt ut necessitatem adiungant, in eos valebit illa conclusio ; qui autem causas antecedentes non dicent perfeetas neque principales, in eos nihil valebit. Quod enim dicantur assensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit facile a se explicari putat ; nam quamquam assensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim assensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt ; id autem cum accidit, suapte natura quod superest et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem
43 putat. XIX. ' Ut igitur,' inquit, ' qui protrusit cylindrum dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem,

[a] To render *φαντασία*, which refers to any of the senses, Cicero commonly uses *visum*, which properly denotes the effect of an object on the sense of sight.

[b] This illustration from the motion of an agricultural roller (*κύλινδρος*) and a child's top (*στρόβιλος*), here assigned to Chrysippus, is not recorded elsewhere.

place by fate, it does indeed follow that everything takes place from antecedent causes, but not from principal and perfect but auxiliary and proximate causes. And if these causes themselves are not in our power, it does not follow that desire also is not in our power. On the other hand if we were to say that all things happen from perfect and principal causes, it would then follow that, as those causes are not in our power, desire would not be in our power
42 either. Hence the train of argument in question will be valid against those who introduce fate in such a manner as to make it involve necessity; but it will have no validity against those who do not allege perfect and principal causes as antecedent. For they think that they can easily explain the meaning of the statement that assent takes place from pre-ordained causes; for although assent cannot take place unless prompted by a sense-presentation,[a] nevertheless since that presentation supplies a proximate and not a principal cause, this, according to Chrysippus, is explained by the theory which we stated just now, not indeed proving that assent can take place without being aroused by any external force (for assent must necessarily be actuated by our seeing an object), but Chrysippus goes back to his roller and spinning-top, which cannot begin to move unless they are pushed or struck, but which when this has happened, he thinks, continue to move of their own nature, the roller rolling forward and the top spinning round.[b]

43 XIX. 'In the same way therefore,' he says, 'as a person who has pushed a roller forward has given it a beginning of motion, but has not given it the capacity to roll, so a sense-presentation when it impinges will it is true impress and as it were seal its appearance

and also 'assent' to sense-presentations as representing the objects.

sed assensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quemadmodum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa quod reliquum est suapte vi et natura movebitur. Quod si aliqua res efficeretur sine causa antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri ; sin omnibus quaecumque fiunt verisimile est causam antecedere, quid afferri potcrit eur non omnia fato fieri fatendum sit ? modo intellegatur quae sit causarum distinctio ac
44 dissimilitudo.' Haec cum ita sint a Chrysippo explicata, si illi qui negant assensiones fato fieri, fateantur tamen eas sine[1] viso antecedente fieri, alia ratio est ; sed si concedunt anteire visa nec tamen fato fieri assensiones quod proxima illa et continens causa non moveat assensionem, vide ne idem dicant. Neque enim Chrysippus, concedens assensionis proximam et continentem causam esse in viso positam, eam[2] causam ad assentiendum necessariam esse concedet, ut, si omnia fato fiant, omnia fiant causis antecedentibus et necessariis ; itemque illi qui ab hoc dissentiunt confitentes non fieri assensiones sine praecursione visorum, dicent, si omnia fato fierent eiusmodi ut nihil fieret nisi praegressione causae, confitendum esse fato fieri omnia ; ex quo facile intel-

[1] sine *Lambinus :* non sine *codd.*
[2] eam *Turnebus :* neque eam *codd.*

on the mind, but the act of assent will be in our power, and as we said in the case of the roller, though given a push from without, as to the rest will move by its own force and nature. If some event were produced without antecedent cause, it would not be true that all things take place by fate; but if it is probable that with all things whatever that take place there is an antecedent cause, what reason will it be possible to adduce why we should not have to admit that all things take place by fate?—only provided that the nature of the distinction and difference between
44 causes is understood.' As this is the form in which these doctrines are set out by Chrysippus, if the people who deny that acts of assent take place by fate nevertheless would admit that those acts take place without an antecedent sense-presentation, it is a different theory; but if they allow that sense-presentations come first, yet nevertheless acts of assent do not take place by fate, because assent is not prompted by the proximate and contiguous cause stated, surely this comes to the same thing. For Chrysippus, while admitting that the proximate and contiguous cause of assent is situated in a perceived object, will not admit that this cause is necessary for the act of assenting, so that if all things take place by fate all things take place from antecedent and necessary causes; and also the thinkers who disagree with him in admitting that assent does not take place without the previous passage of sensory images will similarly say that, if everything were caused by fate in such a manner that nothing did take place without the precedent occurrence of a cause, it would have to be admitted that all things take place by fate; and from this it is easy to understand that

This theory defended.

lectu est, quoniam utrique patefacta atque explicata sententia sua ad eumdem exitum veniant, verbis eos,
45 non re dissidere. Omninoque cum haec sit distinctio, ut quibusdam in rebus vere dici possit cum hae causae antegressae sint non esse in nostra potestate quin illa eveniant quorum causae fuerint, quibusdam autem in rebus causis antegressis in nostra tamen esse potestate ut illud[1] aliter eveniat, hanc distinctionem utrique approbant; sed alteri censent quibus in rebus cum causae antecesserint non[2] sit in nostra potestate ut aliter illa eveniant, illas fato fieri, quae autem in nostra potestate sint, ab his fatum abesse....
46 XX. Hoc modo hanc causam disceptari oportet, non ab atomis errantibus et de via declinantibus praesidium petere. 'Declinat,' inquit, 'atomus.' Primum cur? aliam enim quandam vim motus habebunt a Democrito impulsionis quam plagam ille appellat, a te, Epicure, gravitatis et ponderis. Quae ergo nova causa in natura est quae declinet atomum (aut num sortiuntur inter se quae declinet, quae non?) aut cur minimo declinent intervallo, maiore non, aut cur declinent uno minimo, non declinent duobus aut
47 tribus? Optare hoc quidem est, non disputare. Nam neque extrinsecus impulsam atomum loco moveri et declinare dicis, neque in illo inani per quod

[1] illud : aliud *codd. plurimi.*
[2] non *Creuzer* : ita ut non *codd.*

since both parties, when their opinion has been developed and unfolded, come to the same ultimate position, the difference between them is one of words
45 and not of fact. And putting it broadly, inasmuch as the distinction can be made that whereas in some things it can truly be said that when certain antecedent causes have occurred it is not in our power to prevent certain results of which they were the causes from happening, yet in some things, although antecedent causes have occurred, it is nevertheless within our power to make the event turn out otherwise,—this distinction is approved by both sides; but one of the two schools holds that although fate does govern those matters in which when antecedent causes have occurred it is not in our power to make the results turn out otherwise, yet fate is not present in the case of matters which are in our power. . . .

Epicurus's 'uncaused swerve' unnecessary to rebut fatalism, and meaningless.

46 XX. "This is the proper method of discussing this question,—one should not seek assistance from atoms that roam and swerve out of their path. 'The atom does swerve,' he says. In the first place what causes the swerve? for the motive force that they will get from Democritus is a different one, a driving force termed by him a 'blow'; from you, Epicurus, they will get the force of gravity or weight. What fresh cause therefore exists in nature to make the atom swerve (or do the atoms cast lots among them which is to swerve and which not?) or to serve as the reason for their making a very small swerve and not a large one, or for their making one very small swerve and not two or three swerves? This is wishful think-
47 ing, not investigation. For you do not say that the atom moves its position and swerves owing to being driven by an external force, nor that there has been

feratur atomus quidquam fuisse causae cur ea non e regione ferretur, nec in ipsa atomo mutationis aliquid factum esse[1] quam ob rem naturalem sui ponderis motum non teneret. Ita cum attulisset nullam causam quae istam declinationem efficeret, tamen aliquid sibi dicere videtur cum id dicat quod omnium mentes
48 aspernentur ac respuant. Nec vero quisquam magis confirmasse[2] mihi videtur non modo fatum verum etiam necessitatem et vim omnium rerum sustulisseque motus animi voluntarios, quam hic qui aliter obsistere fato fatetur se non potuisse nisi ad has commenticias declinationes confugisset. Nam ut essent atomi, quas quidem esse mihi probari nullo modo potest, tamen declinationes istae numquam explicarentur ; nam si atomis ut gravitate ferantur tributum est necessitate naturae, quod omne pondus nulla re impediente moveatur et feratur necesse est, illud quoque necesse est, declinare, quibusdam atomis, vel si volunt omnibus, naturaliter ?[3] . . .

[1] *Davisius :* est.
[2] *Rackham :* confirmare *codd.*
[3] *punctum Rackham.*

any factor in the void through which the atom travels to cause it not to travel in a straight line, nor that any change has taken place in the atom itself to cause it not to retain the natural motion of its own weight. Accordingly although he introduced no cause to occasion this swerve of yours, nevertheless he thinks that he is talking sense when he is saying something
48 that all men's minds scornfully reject. And in truth no one in my opinion has done more to uphold not only fate but also an all-controlling necessity, or to abolish voluntary movements of the mind, than has this philosopher who confesses that he has been unable to withstand fate in any other way than by taking refuge in these fictitious swerves. For if one granted the existence of the atoms, although I for my part find it entirely impossible to accept that they do exist, nevertheless there would never be any explanation of those swerves that you talk of; for if it is owing to a necessity of nature that the atoms are assigned the property of travelling by force of gravity, because every heavy body must necessarily move and travel when nothing hinders it, is that alleged swerve also necessary for some atoms, or, if they choose, for all, in the order of nature? . . ."

FRAGMENTA HUIUS LIBRI

1. *Gellius, Noct. Attic. vii. 2. 15. M. Cicero in libro quem de fato conscripsit, cum quaestionem istam diceret obscurissimam esse et implicatissimam, Chrysippum quoque philosophum non expedisse se in ea ait his verbis :* Chrysippus, aestuans laboransque quonam pacto[1] explicet et fato omnia fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo.

2. *Servius ad Vergil. Aen. iii. 376—'volvitque vices.' Definitio fati secundum Tullium, qui ait* : Fatum est conexio rerum per aeternitatem se invicem tenens, quae suo ordine et lege sua[2] variatur, ita tamen ut ipsa varietas habeat aeternitatem.

3. *Augustinus, De Civitate Dei v. 8. Illi quoque versus Homeri huic sententiae suffragantur, quos Cicero in Latinum vertit* :

> tales sunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse
> Iuppiter auctiferas lustravit lumine terras.

Nec in hac quaestione auctoritatem haberet poetica

[1] pacto *suppl. edd.*
[2] sua *add. Ax.*

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[a] *i.e.* the belief in fate, interpreted as meaning that all events, including the actions of men, are caused by God's

FRAGMENTS OF *DE FATO*

1. In the book that he wrote on the subject of fate Marcus Cicero says that the question which you raise is very obscure and involved, and he remarks that the philosopher Chrysippus also had not cleared up his position with regard to it. Cicero's words are 'Chrysippus, finding himself quite at sea in the difficulty of how to explain his combination of universal fatalism with human free-will, ties himself up in the following knot.' Fate and freewill.

2. (Jove) 'plies the turns of fortune.' A definition of fate according to Tully, who says: 'Fate is the interconnexion of events that alternates continuously throughout eternity, varying in conformity with a law of its own and an order of its own, yet in such a manner that this variation is itself eternal.' Fate.

3. This view [a] is also supported by those verses of Homer, which Cicero renders in Latin: Mental light.

> The minds of men are such as is the light
> Wherewith the fruitful earth has been illumined
> By Father Jove himself.

Nor would the view of a poet on this question have

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will, which guides men when they are willing to comply and draws them on when they are unwilling.

Cicero translates *Odyssey* xviii. 136 f.:

> τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
> οἷον ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

sententia ; sed quoniam Stoicos dicit vim fati afferentes istos ex Homero versus solere usurpare, non de illius poetae sed illorum philosophorum opinione tractatur, cum per istos versus quos disputationi adhibent quam de fato habent quid sentiant esse fatum apertissime declaratur, quoniam Iovem appellant, quem summum deum putant, a quo connexionem dicunt pendere fatorum.

4. *Macrobius, Saturnalia iii. 16. 3 sq. Et ne vilior sit testis poeta, accipite assertore Cicerone in quo honore fuit hic piscis apud P. Scipionem Africanum illum et Numantinum. Haec sunt in dialogo de fato verba Ciceronis :* Nam cum esset apud se ad Lavernium Scipio unaque Pontius, allatus est forte Scipioni acupenser, qui admodum raro capitur sed est piscis, ut ferunt, in primis nobilis. Cum autem Scipio unum et alterum ex eis qui eum salutatum venerant invitavisset pluresque etiam invitaturus videretur, in aurem Pontius, Scipio, inquit, vide quid agas : acupenser iste paucorum hominum est.

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[a] *Cf.* §§ 13 note, 27 note.

[b] Otherwise unknown; as also is the application that Cicero made of this anecdote in his argument.

authority ; but since he (Cicero) says that the Stoics are in the habit of quoting those verses of Homer when adducing the power of fate, the matter being treated is not the opinion of that poet but of those philosophers, as the verses referred to which they introduce into their discussion of the subject of fate serve to show very clearly what they consider fate to be, since they call it Jove, whom they deem the supreme deity, from whom they say that the linked chain of the fates is suspended.

4. And lest the poet should be too cheap a witness, learn on the affirmation of Cicero the honour in which this fish stood with the famous Publius Scipio,[a] the victor of Africa and Numantia. These are Cicero's words in his dialogue on fate : ' Scipio was at his place at Lavernium, and Pontius[b] was staying with him, when there happened to arrive for Scipio a present of a sturgeon, a fish not often caught, but said to be extremely highly valued. Scipio invited one or two of the people who had called to pay their respects to stay to dinner, and seemed to be going to invite more, so Pontius whispered to him : " Mind what you are doing, Scipio ; your sturgeon is a dish for a few." ' The sturgeon.